China’s Cyberspace Administration and its Ministry of Public Security have mooted an initiative to create internet identification for netizens in China. Plans are afoot to issue digital identification that will be used by netizens instead of their real identities when opening online profiles. The justification for this move is to safeguard users from sharing personal data, which may be retained by private digital platforms. While the authorities have maintained that applying for internet identification is voluntary, there is apprehension that the Communist Party of China (CPC) will exercise greater oversight over the Net in future.
These developments point to Chinese President Xi Jinping tightening his grip on civil society. The exercise is not limited to public life but seems to encompass the education sector and the military as well. The Party leadership met in mid-July for its yearly plenary session, which determined the direction of important policy initiatives. The resolution of the session announced plans to work on a unified national population management system.
Project Of ‘National Rejuvenation’
A new set of regulations was issued recently with respect to educational institutions that seek to improve the pool of educators. The main aim of the Party-state is to uplift the societal status of teachers, enhancing their skills, and paring down their workload. Xi wants teachers to not merely impart lessons but to incubate a high-quality workforce for his vision of a modern Chinese economy. At the same time, the rules seek educators to be in sync with the Party’s line on ideological matters, and draw the line with respect to any violations. According to government statistics, China has one of the largest combine of teachers, totalling over 18 million.
Concomitantly, students, too, are in the Party’s crosshairs. In what may be seen as the importance of the education sector, China’s political elite in its Politburo Standing Committee and officials across provinces attended Xi’s address to mark Teachers’ Day this month. While Xi made a pitch to expand academic exchanges overseas and research cooperation and sought a greater say in international education governance, he also underscored the need to impart more political training in classrooms.
He emphasised that this ideological guidance would serve as the foundation for his project of ‘national rejuvenation’, which seeks to build the nation’s strength. There is also stress on fostering a ‘sense of community’ for the Chinese nation through the use of the official script and language.
Protecting Future Generations From ‘Sabotage’
In an article published in the Communist Party of China’s journal, Qiushi, Xi raised the bogey of hostile forces in the West trying to subvert the Party’s leadership, and plans of a ‘colour revolution’ in China. He justifies the moves of the Party at exerting greater control in order to protect the future generation from sabotage, and create ‘socialist successors’.
Chinese state-run media builds on Xi’s thesis, warning of efforts by intelligence agencies to specifically target young students for recruitment and infiltration through social media. In a damage-control mode, new textbooks have been issued on the theme of national security that seek to wean students away from pop culture’s potential for instigating a ‘colour revolution’.
The Ideological Oversight Over PLA
In the realm of defence, Xi, as the chairperson of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is tasked with oversight of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), highlighted the need for rectification in the services. China’s Ministry of National Defence posted an article that credited Xi for tackling the challenge of “lax discipline” in the PLA ranks that endured during his predecessors’ tenures. The commentary supported improved supervision mechanisms, citing Chairman Mao Zedong’s Yan’an Rectification campaign. The ministry seeks better discipline within the ranks. The Yan’an campaign of the 1940s sought to improve the Party’s ideological moorings with rank-and-file poring over Mao’s speeches. Historians state that the rectification campaign’s outcome was that cadres critical of Mao were on the Party’s sidelines, with the Chairman strengthening his position.
Relying On ‘Faithfuls’
In recent years, the issue of corruption in the armed forces has also come to light. Recently, two former defence ministers – Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu – were expelled from the Party over accusations of bribery. In a conference of the military brass convened in June, incidentally in Yan’an, Xi stated his intent to come down heavily on corrupt elements and terminate the root causes of corruption. He already supports scrutiny of departments engaged in defence-related manufacturing by anti-corruption officials to unearth corruption.
Xi has underlined that the Party’s strength lies in PLA’s organisational accord and that the ‘gun’ (meaning the army) ought to be headed by those faithful to the Party. In line with this, the PLA is increasingly being staffed by “politically reliable” personnel in the upper echelons. For example, He Hongjun, who served as the executive deputy director of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Political Work Department, which is in charge of party-building and political education within the military, was named General.
A Flailing Economy
The triggers for Xi calling for greater control citing the bogeyman of a colour revolution lie in conditions that have developed as a result of his own policies. Chinese policymakers targeted a GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth of around 5% this year but could achieve only up to 4.7% in the April to June quarter. Factory output has stalled and the sale of new flats is at an 18-year low. Unemployment remains high; the Party even stopped publishing the damaging statistics recently.
Second, labour unrest in the form of strikes in factories increased in the January-June period, according to China’s official data. Social unrest has caught the Party unawares, as also evidenced by the demonstrations that broke out across China in December 2022 against COVID-19 restrictions. In the same year, protests against the Party took the form of many boycotting paying mortgages on property to financial institutions in light of the worsening economic situation due to the pandemic-induced curbs.
To conclude, as the economic situation worsens in China, Xi is tightening his grip on disparate sectors like military, education, and civil society interactions. Through greater social control, the Party seeks to protect itself from the fate of the Soviet Union, whose political model forms the foundation for China.
(The writer is a China Fellow at Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
